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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

LEHI IRRIGATION COMPANY,
Plaintiff arnd .Appelkont,
V!.

Case No.

CLARENCE T. JONES and ED. H.
WAT·SON, State Engineer of the
State of Utah,
Defenaants ~and R~espondents.

7189

RE'SPO·NDENT 'S REPLY T·O
PETITION FOR REHEARING

The petition for rehearing, except on Point 1, as
to evidence, raise.s no matter of law or fact not heretofor~argned at length by amicus curine and considered
by the court.
While mentioning that this is ·an appeal from the
District Court, the petition ignores the fact that the
matters again attempted to be rais·ed and discussed, were
not in the trial court or reserved for consideration by this
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court, on appeal, at all. The argument again emphasizes
the fact that, as between the actual parties to this action, and on the question decided and reserved, the decisions of the trial court, and of this court, are correct.
This petition, erroneously, ignores the settled principles, (a) that questions not presented and reserved in
the trial court are not available on ap~p~eal (3 Am. Jur.
p. 25), (b) that, except where interests litigated below
have .been succeeded to by death of a party or by succession, as in changes in officials, the only p~rties who
can be heard, ~n the questions reserved, are those in the
trial court (2 Am. Jur. p. 941), and (c) that. rights of
others are in no way affected or. prejudiced by the judgment or the appeal.
If confusion is to be avoided, it is ve_ry ·important
to adhere to the plain and established p·rocedure under
our water laws, that (a) if a party does not protest an
application, his rights are unaffected by any order of
the State Engineer thereon thereafter, (b) that he is,
therefore, not aggrieved by the order, and does not have
a right of ap·peal therefrom, the statute providing that
any such order is subject to ''all prior rights'', (c) that
parties aggrieved may appeal and have a trial de nova,
and (d) that such trial is one ''in equity generally'', and,
therefore, the· rules referred to in the preceding paragraph apply.
The petition seeks to pick out certain statements of
the court, and ·assume effects of the decision· not justified, and, by twisting thes·e, seeks grounds of unjustifiable criticism.
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We will refer to each ground of this ·petition briefly,
and \Yill cite our first brief, by use of th~ letter '' F' ', and
our brief in reply to amicus curiae brief, by use of the
letter "R ".
1. The statement by the court that the engineer's
letter was the ''foundation of this appeal (from the State
Engineer) and the trial (thereafter) de nov.a in the
District Court, is entirely correct''. This is an appeal
from the District Court, but the foundation was just as
it was stated.
The letter embraced the EnginHer's findings. Without objection, and by understanding between the parties
to the action, it was introduced to establish the facts
which his investigation had revealed to him. T,echnically,
perhaps, the defendant might have required us to p·ut
him on the. stand, to introduce these facts. This was not
insisted upon. No point of error is preserved. Nor do
we believe that these facts were ''neither relevant or
material''.
As held in the Terry case, 77 P. (2) at 366, that on
this proceeding, ''the court stands in the same position
as the Engineer''. It is true that neither he nor the
trial court "considered the rights of the United States",
or the rights of many other peop,le who may be interested
in Utah Lake drainage. That is one reason why these
cannot be considered here. And no such rights are, in
the least, affected by what has been decided.
2. This court did not say that its decision was ''controlled by the pronouncement in Little Cottonwood'', etc.
It merely cited this case, among others, as supporting
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its decision, and affirmed the rule announced by all of
these. (202 P. (2) at 893, Par. 2)
As we pointed out (R. 15-18), there is nothing in
the 1939 amendments calling for any change in the rule,
as announced in all these cases, and here. At least two
of these other cases, cited by this court, were decided
.long after 1939.
And, notwithstanding that the court here again
points out that "The prop:osed· source" of the water, as
referred to in 100-3-8, is. the springs here, petitioner
persists in ignoring this vital fact.
Another point that is fatal to all of petitioner's argum·ents on this statute and as to "uwapp~o1pvriated w~ater"
is that the Weber River Application and Application
No. 12144 on the Lake, and the approval thereof, have
appropriated no water. That any waters referred to
therein are '' unap·propriated'' until final proof and certification of appropriation. Further, that the trial court,
and this court, cannot here determine water rights at
all, or what is, or what the appropriated water rights of
these applicants may be, or are.
3. We do not understand that this court held that
''the waters in question are those within the scope of
approved 'Application 12144". The court said only that
this exchange application "indicates some interest in
the seepage water which returned to Utah Lake", and
then points out some reasons why this spring water may
never be within Application 12144, and that the applications here may even result in helping the supply ther·eunder. The court also points out reasons why it cannot
•
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decide this lake question here, and without prop·er ''proceeding·s, arguments, and parties, which may be adversely
j

affected''~

4. It is complained that the court here held "that,
as between the owners of an approved application for
a right to use 'vater and 'a subsequent application for a
right to use from the same source'', the burden is upon
the former to establish "interference or conflict".
Further, that the waters of the Jones application "have
been definitely determined to be those covered by No.
12144".
We cannot find where the court so held, either as
to the parties, or as to the source of water here, or that
it had ever been ''determined'' what water rights exist
under No. 12144. We are certain that this determination has not been made. We think the burden will be on
the party seeking to establish his right on his final proof.
The court, with great p·atience and courtesy to am.icus curiae, went outside of the issues here to discuss the
claims made, and to enlighten amicus cur+bae, and made it
clear, at some length, that there is no issue or proper
proceedings or parties for the determination of the
things discussed on these other ap·plications.
5. The point raised by this number is simply a reiteration of that raised under number 4. Again, we cannot see where the court has held, what it is there claimed.
Reference is made under this number, again, to the
Weber or "foreign water shed filings". That is, apparently, the "near source", again erroneously so referred
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to by petitioner. Those filings are in no way before the
court.
We cited, at some length, authorities (R. 8-12) that
a person, having an actual right to the use of water, may
not object to its use by another, when such owner is
not in position to, or is not making a beneficial use thereof. There has been no appropriation of this water under
any of these filings, or at all.
It is clear, and without dispute (Tr. 9, 13, 14, 23),
that the increase in these _Jones springs (''proposed
source'') results mainly from irrigation by defendant
under his previous rights, and as supplemented by his
rights as a stockholder in this project. That such irrigation is on his own higher lands, and on the same tract of
land in which the springs arise. This is the near source
of supply.
And, as pointed out by the Court, there is a question, not yet presented, as to whether the owners of either
the Weber Applications or No. 12144 can ever claim this
water,.or interfere with defendant's use of it. This question could come up in the general adjudication suit pending, or, possibly, when the attempt to make final proof
and acquire certificate of appropriation is made on these
Weber and Utah Lake filings, or on ours. How can this
project use other peoples' lands for run off or swamp
storage of seeping waters~
6. For reasons already stated, there is no merit
in petitioner's ground 6. The reservation of these matters, ''until a proper case'' is presented, was, obviously,
proper and necessary.
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In this connection, the opinion here, in attempting
to go as far as possible to explain the contentions of
anli.czt,s culria.e, says something with relation to judicial
notice of records, which we think may prove embarrassing.
While this, in no way, affects the decision here, as
the Court indicated, we are concerned about its affect
upon future litigation, and, therefore, consider it our
duty to present our views. This is somewhat in the role
of amicus curiae, because it arose in discussion of matters not actually here involv:ed.
If this matter of judicial knowledge, as stated by
the court, is limited to the purpose of noticing records
for discussion of the irrelevant ~uggestions of :amicus
curiae, merely, of course, it could do no harm. But, if
this he followed as a guide in future water litigation&,
we fear that it would result in nothing hut trouble and
confusion for the courts and litigants.
The opinion says (202 P. (2) at 895), "the State
Engineer had before him ... his own records''. These,
''reveal that there were approved applications which
brought about this (Deer Creek) water, and also an exchange application which indicates some interest ... in
the seepage water which returned to Utah Lake. In addition, he had ... knowledge of this matter as it developed
.
in' ' the Tan.ner case.
Then, after stating that none of these records were
ever put before the trial court, the opinion says, ''by
virtue of S~ec. 104-46-1(3), as interpreted in'' State Lwnd
Board v. Ririe, 56 Utah 213., "it is clear that judicial
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knowledge may he taken of tthese doCUtmernts as publric
reoords. Thus, it is immaterial that they were not introduced in evidence''.
This matter is too big for full briefing here. In our
second brief ( R. 18-21), we cited three Utah cas·es holding that neither the trial court nor this court could take
judicial notice of their records in another and different
case, and that neither court can, in another case, take
notice of a ''determination of water rights filed by the
State Engineer with the Clerk of the Court", where such
document was not vle aded in the case under consideration. The document there involved was, by statute, required to he made and kept of record in the ~tate En~
gineer 's O·ffice, and a copy filed in the supervising court.
We are aware that such determination was not a final
adjudication of the water rights involved, until approved
by the court, but neither is an application to appropriate
water, or the approval thereof, an adjudication of water
rights.
The first point we suggest on this is that judicial
notice is a rule of evidence. It simply relieves a party
Jitigant of proof of some allegations of fact, upon which
he relies. (20 Am. Jur. p. 47)
If, a.s indicated by the Utah decisions referred to
above, the document or record is not pleaded as a basis
of claim, or presented as an issue in the litigation, it
could not properly he judicially noticed therein. Such
notice, it seems, could not inj·ect, esp.ecially on final appeal, new claims or issues, and, particularly, a possible
claim by parties foreign to the litigation. We do not
1
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believe that this eourt intended to indicate that it could.
The contrary appears to be indicated in other portions
of the opinion.
The trial judge had rejected the applications as not
being relevant or material. His ruling was not reserved
or presented here. There clearly was no claim or issue
pleaded as to these. If that court had been asked to
judicially notice them, his ruling is indicated by the one
he made in rejecting them. Thus, it seems clear that this
Court cannot rightly consider them on appeal from the
trial court's judgment.
The above quoted statements appear as dicta. They
are to the effect that documents or records in the State
Engineer's Office may be judicially noticed, ·though not
brought to the attention of the trial court, or offered at
the trial. We think this indication is very serious, even
if these documents did bear upon issues between the
parties, as raised by their pleadings.
The State Engineer's Office has numerous records.
He has taken thousands of measurements on water
sources throughout the State. There have been hundreds
of statements and rulings contained in letters by different holders of this office. Some of thes·e,· as to the
same waters, are conflicting and hard to reconcile.
This suggestion will, also, affect general adjudication suits. Can a water user, having, or asserting, some
general claim in the trial court, leave the court to search
the Engineer's Office, or, on appeal, leave this court to do
so, for supporting or conflicting evidence~ Or can the
attorneys in any water litigation rely upon these records
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without bringing them to the attention of the trial court?
We doubt that the Engineer himself, in any hearing, should be required· to examine back over all his records, or be confronted, on appeal, with something not
brought to his attention by the parties.
We call· attention now that 104-46-1(3) does not
m·ention notice of "public records", or "documents".
It does mention ''official acts of the ... executive" and
the other two ·departrnents of the State, as something
that may be judicially noticed.
The Constitution creates the three departm-ents, and
says (Art. VII, Sec. 1), this executive department "shall
consist of'' the elective State officers, there named.
The Ririe case cited (56 Utah 213), said nothing about
noticing records. It held that the court could take judicial knowledge that the Land Board and Auditor had
bought ·town bonds, as State investments, and said the
court ''is authorized to take . . . judicial. knowledge of
the Mt:s and p,-,oceedings of the two offices''. That both
are "parts and parcels of the' executive department".
This last was true, as applied to the Auditor.
As stated before, it is not necessary for us to argue
this matter. We merely call it to the attention of the
court for such consideration as it may be worth.
7.. Under this number, petitioner complains of the
statement of the court that no vested rights with which
plaintiff's. applications will interfere." are called to the
attention of the court''.
· This ·statement, of course,. is· entirely correct. None
of the applications here discussed, or the_approval there-
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of, establish any vested rights, or any water rights, or
any actual appropriation of water. -It is for this reason
that the cases cited on this petition, dealing with conflicts
with vested water rights, have no bearing here. Nor is
there anything that destroys, or in the least relates to,
what "'"as decided in Tanrner v. Beacom, or that affects
any claim of the clients of amicus curiae, whoever they
are, and they are in no way prejudiced.
The Tanner case held two things. One, that th·e
statutory power of the Engineer to withhold app·roval
of an application in the interest of ·public welfare was
properly exercised.
It also held that 100-3-21, the priority section, '' applies only to vested rights, and not to the right to appropriate water in the future" (p. 962), and that "the doctrine of res ajudieata does not operate to affect strangers
to a judgment". (p. 959)
These holdings are in harmony with all previous decisions as we have heretofore and hereinabove attempted
to ·point out. The latter are applicable to the matters
argued here.
Mr. Clyde, who appeared as attorney for the State
Engineer on our first brief, has since resigned his position.
We respectfully submit that the petition for rehearing should be denied.
MULLINER, PRINCE and MULLINER

Attorneys for Respondent
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